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Abstract
Background: In many geographic regions, both in developing and in developed countries, the
number of health workers is insufficient to achieve population health goals. Financial incentives for
return of service are intended to alleviate health worker shortages: A (future) health worker enters
into a contract to work for a number of years in an underserved area in exchange for a financial
pay-off.
Methods:  We carried out systematic literature searches of PubMed, the Excerpta Medica
database, the Cumulative Index to Nursing and Allied Health Literature, and the National Health
Services Economic Evaluation Database for studies evaluating outcomes of financial-incentive
programs published up to February 2009. To identify articles for review, we combined three search
themes (health workers or students, underserved areas, and financial incentives). In the initial
search, we identified 10,495 unique articles, 10,302 of which were excluded based on their titles
or abstracts. We conducted full-text reviews of the remaining 193 articles and of 26 additional
articles identified in reference lists or by colleagues. Forty-three articles were included in the final
review. We extracted from these articles information on the financial-incentive programs (name,
location, period of operation, objectives, target groups, definition of underserved area, financial
incentives and obligation) and information on the individual studies (authors, publication dates,
types of study outcomes, study design, sample criteria and sample size, data sources, outcome
measures and study findings, conclusions, and methodological limitations). We reviewed program
results (descriptions of recruitment, retention, and participant satisfaction), program effects
(effectiveness in influencing health workers to provide care, to remain, and to be satisfied with
work and personal life in underserved areas), and program impacts (effectiveness in influencing
health systems and health outcomes).
Results: Of the 43 reviewed studies 34 investigated financial-incentive programs in the US. The
remaining studies evaluated programs in Japan (five studies), Canada (two), New Zealand (one) and
South Africa (one). The programs started between 1930 and 1998. We identified five different
types of programs (service-requiring scholarships, educational loans with service requirements,
service-option educational loans, loan repayment programs, and direct financial incentives).
Financial incentives to serve for one year in an underserved area ranged from year-2000 United
States dollars 1,358 to 28,470. All reviewed studies were observational. The random-effects
estimate of the pooled proportion of all eligible program participants who had either fulfilled their
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obligation or were fulfilling it at the time of the study was 71% (95% confidence interval 60–80%).
Seven studies compared retention in the same (underserved) area between program participants
and non-participants. Six studies found that participants were less likely than non-participants to
remain in the same area (five studies reported the difference to be statistically significant, while one
study did not report a significance level); one study did not find a significant difference in retention
in the same area. Thirteen studies compared provision of care or retention in any underserved area
between participants and non-participants. Eleven studies found that participants were more likely
to (continue to) practice in any underserved area (nine studies reported the difference to be
statistically significant, while two studies did not provide the results of a significance test); two
studies found that program participants were significantly less likely than non-participants to remain
in any underserved area. Seven studies investigated the satisfaction of participants with their work
and personal lives in underserved areas.
Conclusion: Financial-incentive programs for return of service are one of the few health policy
interventions intended to improve the distribution of human resources for health on which
substantial evidence exists. However, the majority of studies are from the US, and only one study
reports findings from a developing country, limiting generalizability. The existing studies show that
financial-incentive programs have placed substantial numbers of health workers in underserved
areas and that program participants are more likely than non-participants to work in underserved
areas in the long run, even though they are less likely to remain at the site of original placement.
As none of the existing studies can fully rule out that the observed differences between participants
and non-participants are due to selection effects, the evidence to date does not allow the inference
that the programs have caused increases in the supply of health workers to underserved areas.
Background
In many geographic regions, both in developing and in
developed countries, the number of health workers is
insufficient to achieve population health goals. The 2004
Joint Learning Initiative (JLI) report Human Resources for
Health estimated that "Sub-Saharan countries must nearly
triple their current numbers of workers by adding the
equivalent of one million workers through retention,
recruitment, and training if they are to come close to
approaching the MDGs [Millennium Development
Goals] for health" [1]; the 2006 World Health Report con-
cluded that " [t]he severity of the health workforce crisis in
some of the world's poorest countries is illustrated by
WHO estimates that 57 of them (36 of which are in
Africa) have a deficit of 2.4 million doctors, nurses and
midwives" [2]. In many developed countries, there are
areas (commonly rural or poor communities) that are
considered to be underserved with health workers (for
instance, because the number of workers is insufficient to
provide primary health care to all residents in an area) [3-
5].1
Interventions intended to alleviate health worker short-
ages include selective recruitment and training for practice
in underserved areas, improvements in working or living
conditions, compulsory service, or incentives [6]. In this
article, we systematically review the evidence on one spe-
cific set of interventions: financial incentives for return of
service. These interventions work as follows. A health
worker in training or a fully trained health worker enters
into a contract to work for a number of years in an under-
served area in exchange for a financial pay-off. Financial
incentives can increase the numbers of health workers in
underserved areas by a number of mechanisms. First, they
can redirect the flow of those health workers who would
have been educated without any financial incentive from
well-served to underserved areas, for instance by decreas-
ing the net emigration flow of nurses and physicians from
developing to developed countries [7-9] or by increasing
the net flow of physicians from urban tertiary care to rural
primary care in developed countries [10,11]. This first
mechanism can take hold if there are (future) health
workers who normally would not work in an underserved
area, but who are willing to do so in return for a financial
incentive. Second, financial-incentive programs can add
health workers to the pool of workers who would have
been educated in the absence of such programs and place
them in underserved areas. The second mechanism can
take hold if, on the one hand, there are qualified candi-
dates who would not have the means to finance a health
care education without a financial incentive and, on the
other hand, a country's health care education system can
absorb additional students. Third, financial-incentive pro-
grams can decrease the outflow of health workers from
underserved areas, if they prolong the retention times in
underserved areas of those workers who participate in a
financial-incentive program, but who would have worked
in an underserved area even if they had not received a
financial incentive. Improved retention in this group of
health workers can be a direct result of the contractualBMC Health Services Research 2009, 9:86 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/9/86
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obligation to remain for a certain number of years in an
underserved area or can be caused by a program's addi-
tional efforts to increase retention (e.g., by increasing
health workers' satisfaction with their work environment
and career progression, or by increasing the satisfaction of
health workers' families with their integration into the
community) [12]. Fourth, the programs can decrease the
outflow of participating and non-participating health
workers from underserved areas by increasing the number
of health workers in those areas through any of the three
mechanisms described above. Such positive feedback may
occur because increasing the number of health workers
can diminish reasons for non-retention in rural and
remote areas, such as high workload [13-15], lack of con-
tact with colleagues [14], lack of support from medical
specialists [16], or social isolation [15].
We have recently shown that a specific type of financial-
incentive program, scholarships in return for a commit-
ment to deliver antiretroviral treatment in Sub-Saharan
Africa, is highly cost-beneficial under a wide range of
assumptions [17]. In the following, we will first systemat-
ically review studies on financial incentives for return of
service. Then, we will critically summarize the findings
from existing studies and draw implications for policy and
future research. One previous study has systematically
reviewed the evidence on financial-incentive programs for
return of service. Sempowski (2004) reviewed 10 studies
of financial-incentive programs published between Janu-
ary 1966 and July 2002 [18]. The author concluded that
"ROS [return-of-service] programs to rural and underserv-
iced areas have achieved their primary goal of short-term
recruitment but have had less success with long-term
retention" [18]. Prima facie, an update of this systematic
review is useful because more than six years have passed
since the end of the period of publication of articles con-
sidered therein. In addition to the update of evidence, our
review differs from the previous one in two aspects. First,
the previous review was restricted to studies of physicians,
while we consider studies of all types of health workers.
Second, the previous review focused on program results
(i.e., descriptions of outcomes among program partici-
pants without comparison to outcomes in non-partici-
pants) [18], while our review includes program results,
program effects (i.e., analysis of program effectiveness at
the individual-level through comparison of outcomes
among participants and non-participants), and program
impacts (i.e., analysis of program effectiveness at the pop-
ulation level, such as changes in physicians density or
population mortality) (Table 1).
Table 1: Study outcomes
Program results 
(Program outcomes among participants)
Program effects 
(Program effectiveness at the individual level)
Program impacts (Program effectiveness at 
the population level) 
Recruitment Provision of care Health system
What proportion of program participants fulfill 
their obligation to work in an underserved 
area? (14)
Does program participation affect a health 
worker's likelihood of providing care in an 
underserved area? (11)
Does the program affect health systems 
outcomes (e.g., physician density)? (6)
Retention Retention Health
What proportion of program participants 
continue to work in an underserved area after 
having fulfilled their obligation? (17)
Does program participation affect a health 
worker's likelihood of continuing to provide 
care in an underserved area after a certain 
period of time? (7)
Does the program affect health outcomes (e.g., 
mortality)? (1)
Participant satisfaction Participant satisfaction
What proportion of program participants are 
satisfied with
Does program participation affect a health 
worker's satisfaction with
- work in the underserved area - work in the underserved area
- life in the underserved area - life in the underserved areas? (2)
- other aspects of the financial-incentive 
program? (7)
Family satisfaction
What proportion of relatives of program 
participants are satisfied with
- work in the underserved area
- life in the underserved area
- other aspects of the financial-incentive 
program? (3)
The term underserved area in the table encompasses both underserved geographical areas and underserved populations. The number of studies 
investigating the specific outcomes is shown in parentheses. The numbers in parentheses add up to 68. Twenty-five studies contribute 1 outcome 
each to this sum, while nine studies contribute 2 outcomes each, seven studies contribute 3 outcomes each, and one study contributes 4 outcomes. 
Two published articles report the same outcomes from the same study [41,42]; these outcomes are counted only once in the tableBMC Health Services Research 2009, 9:86 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/9/86
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Methods
Data sources and search strategies
We carried out a systematic literature search in four elec-
tronic databases: PubMed [19] in order to cover articles on
financial-incentive programs published in the medical lit-
erature; the Excerpta Medica database (EMBASE) [20] in
order to cover articles in medical journals that are not
included in PubMed, in particular European journals
[21]; the Cumulative Index to Nursing and Allied Health
Literature (CINAHL) [22] in order to cover articles pub-
lished in the literature on nursing and allied health profes-
sions; and National Health Services Economic Evaluation
Database (NHS EED) [23] in order to cover health eco-
nomics studies. We used the Cochrane Library to search in
NHS EED [23]. Because MEDLINE records were included
in the search, we excluded MEDLINE records in both the
EMBASE and the CINAHL search. No search option to
exclude MEDLINE records was available in NHS EED. In
order to detect any early financial-incentive program, we
searched the literature from the earliest date at which
records were available in each of the four databases given
our search strategies. We searched all four databases on 31
January 2009 and included all relevant articles available
in the databases up to the search date. In addition, we
searched the reference lists of all publications included in
the final review as well as of all articles that were excluded
from the review because they were review articles, editori-
als, or commentaries. Finally, we asked colleagues with a
research interest in human resources for health to identify
articles on financial incentives for return of service.
To identify articles for review, we combined three search
themes using the Boolean operator "and": health workers
or students, underserved areas, and financial incentives.
We combined several search terms with the Boolean oper-
ator "or" in order to operationalize the search themes. We
drew the search terms from the controlled vocabularies
used for subject indexing in PubMed (i.e., Medical Subject
Headings (MeSH) [24]), EMBASE (i.e., EMTREE [25]),
and CINAHL (i.e., CINAHL Subject Headings [26]). We
used all search terms from the controlled vocabularies in
their "exploded" versions. That is, in addition to the
selected terms, all narrower terms that are categorized
below it in the vocabulary hierarchies were included in
the searches. While MeSH are available in NHS EED when
searched through the Cochrane Library, we entered the
search terms in all searchable, subject-specific fields (title,
keyword, and abstract), because such a search strategy has
been found to be superior to MeSH-based strategies in
NHS EED [27]. The four search algorithms are shown in
the Appendix.
Selection criteria
Articles were considered for inclusion in the systematic
review if they reported data from a quantitative study of
results, effects, or impacts of at least one financial-incen-
tive program for return of service. We considered articles
published in any language. We excluded studies that eval-
uate programs that attempt to increase the number of
health workers in underserved areas primarily through
non-financial means [28-32]. For instance, studies evalu-
ating the Physician Shortage Area Program (PSAP) of Jef-
ferson Medical College were excluded because the
program aims to increase the number of rural family phy-
sicians primarily through selective admission of candi-
dates to medical school and through intensive exposure of
the program participants to rural family practice, while
offering only "a small amount of additional financial aid
[...] almost entirely in the form of repayable loans", which
"represents only a small portion of each student's entire
tuition and expenses" (Rabinowitz et al. 2005).
Reviews, commentaries, editorials, news and policy briefs
were excluded. Studies of financial incentives for return of
service within the military (e.g., [33]) were excluded
because experiences with return-of-service programs in
the military are likely to be very different from civilian
experiences, as the military can exert more control over its
members than most civilian institutions over citizens.
Studies of financial incentives for research positions (e.g.,
[34]) were excluded because health workers who conduct
medical research are commonly motivated by very differ-
ent factors than health workers in patient care [35], and
this article's objective is to examine the evidence on finan-
cial incentives for return of patient care in underserved
areas. We further excluded studies of financial incentives
to enroll in a specific residency program [36], unless they
were explicitly linked to work in underserved areas, and
studies investigating the attractiveness of hypothetical
financial-incentive programs [37].
After exclusion of 131 duplicate records, our searches
identified a total of 10,495 articles, 10,302 of which were
excluded based on their titles or abstracts. We conducted
full-text reviews of the remaining 193 articles and of 26
additional articles identified in reference lists or by col-
leagues. Forty-three articles were included in the final
review. While we did not apply any language restrictions
in our search, all reviewed titles and abstracts were availa-
ble in English (some as translations of original-language
versions) and all articles included in the final review were
published in English.
Statistical analysis
We used DerSimonian and Laird meta-analysis [38] to
compute both fixed- and random-effects estimates of the
pooled recruitment proportion (and its 95% confidence
interval (CI)). We defined the recruitment proportion as
the proportion of all eligible program participants who
had either fulfilled their service obligation or were fulfill-BMC Health Services Research 2009, 9:86 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/9/86
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ing it at the time of the study. Participants were eligible if
they had completed the required minimum medical train-
ing and were available to fulfill their obligation. Partici-
pants could be unavailable for a number of reasons,
including disease, imprisonment, or temporary deferral of
service. For the meta-analysis, both the recruitment pro-
portion of a program and the total number of eligible pro-
gram participants needed to be known. We thus could
only include those studies in the meta-analysis that
reported sufficient information to calculate these two
measures. To determine the pooled recruitment propor-
tion, the variances of the raw proportions were stabilized
using the Freeman-Tukey double arcsine transformation
[39]. After meta-analysis of the transformed variable, we
retransformed the pooled mean and its 95% CI back to
proportions. Heterogeneity of the recruitment proportion
across studies was diagnosed with the Q test [40]. When
significant heterogeneity was present, we selected the ran-
dom-effects estimates.
Results
Table 1 describes the outcomes that were investigated by
the 43 studies included in the review and the number of
studies investigating each outcome (in parentheses).
Twenty-five studies investigated 1 outcome; nine studies
investigated 2 outcomes; seven studies investigated 3 out-
comes; and one study investigated 4 outcomes. Two pub-
lished articles report the same outcomes from the same
study [41,42]; these study outcomes are counted only
once in Table 1.
Additional file 1 shows descriptions of each of the pro-
grams that were evaluated in at least one of the included
studies. When information on some program characteris-
tics was not available in the reviewed study itself, we
extracted the information from other sources (shown in
the column "Other sources" in the table). All monetary
values in the column "Financial incentive and obligation"
are shown both as they are provided in the reviewed study
and – for ease of comparison – in year-2000 United States
dollars (USD). We used the purchasing power parity index
from the World Bank Development Indicators [43] in
order to translate the values of a non-US currency into US
dollars and the consumer price index from the US Depart-
ment of Labor Bureau of Labor Statistics [44] to adjust for
differences in the real value of one USD over time.
The programs evaluated in the studies included in this
review started between 1930 and 1998. With the excep-
tion of five programs that accepted a range of health pro-
fessionals (the North Carolina Rural Loan Program, the
National Health Service Corps (NHSC), the West Virginia
Recruitment and Retention Community Project, the West
Virginia State Loan Repayment Program in the US, and
the Friends of Mosvold Program in South Africa), the
financial incentives of the evaluated programs were tar-
geted only at future or current physicians (Additional file
1).
With the exception of three programs that cover, respec-
tively, "tuition, entrance and equipment fees and living
expenses" [45],“tuition, fees” and “a living stipend" [46],
and "funds for university tuition, books, residence fees
and food" [47], the precise monetary values of the finan-
cial incentives of all programs included in this review were
available in published articles or on web pages. The finan-
cial incentives per year of service ranged from year-2000
USD 1,358 to 28,470. One study compared the average
award amount across five types of programs – service-
requiring scholarship programs, service-option educa-
tional loans, loan repayment programs, direct financial-
incentive programs, and resident support (in the form of
service-requiring scholarships, loan repayment, or direct
financial incentives). The study did not find significant
differences in the size of the financial incentives [48]
(Additional file 1).
We identified 43 studies that met all our inclusion and
exclusion criteria. The previous systematic review of finan-
cial-incentive programs for return of service by Sem-
powski [18] identified only 10 articles, three of which
were not included in our review. Two articles were not
included because they evaluated a program that "tried to
increase the number of health workers in underserved
areas primarily through non-financial means" [49,50]
(Figure 1); one study was not included because it did not
report "data from a quantitative study of results, effects, or
impacts of financial incentives for return of service" [51]
(see "Selection criteria" above). Of the 36 articles covered
in our study but not included in the review by Sempowski,
17 were published after the end of the review period of the
previous study (i.e., after 2002) [11,48,52-66]. The
remaining articles were not included because the previous
study used different inclusion and exclusion criteria. In
particular, our review considers programmatic outcomes
and health worker types that were not covered in the pre-
vious study (see "Introduction" above).
Of the 43 reviewed studies, 34 investigated financial-
incentive programs in the US, 24 of which evaluated the
NHSC; 8 evaluated programs in specific US states or com-
munities; 1 evaluated both the NHSC and state-based pro-
grams; and 1 evaluated the national Commonwealth
Fund Medical Undergraduate Scholarship Program. Five
studies investigated the Jichi Medical University (JMU)
program in Japan, two assessed the Ontario Under-serv-
iced Area Program (UAP) in Canada, and one study each
evaluated the New South Wales Department of Health
Rural Resident Medical Officer Program (Cadetship Pro-
gram) in New Zealand and the Friends of Mosvold Schol-BMC Health Services Research 2009, 9:86 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/9/86
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Flowchart of the systematic review Figure 1
Flowchart of the systematic review. EMBASE = Excerpta Medica database, CINAHL = Cumulative Index to Nursing and 
Allied Health Literature, NHS EED = National Health Services Economic Evaluation Database.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 10,626 articles identified from databases 
    6,437in PubMed 
   2,513 in EMBASE 
1,238 in CINAHL 
   438 in NHS EED 
10,495 unique articles identified 
43 articles included in final review 
10,302 citations excluded based on screening of titles and abstracts 
x  Intervention does not include a financial incentive for 
return of health care service 
x  No quantitative data 
x  Review studies 
x  Editorials or commentaries 
x  News or policy briefs 
176 articles excluded after full-text review 
x  Intervention does not include a financial incentive for 
return of health care service 
x  Program tries to increase the number of health workers in 
underserved areas primarily through non-financial means 
x  Financial incentive is intended to increase the supply of 
health workers in the military, in research, or in specific 
residency programs  
x  No quantitative data 
x  Review studies 
x  Studies investigating the attractiveness of hypothetical 
financial-incentive programs 
x  Editorials or commentaries 
x  News or policy briefs 
131 duplicate articles eliminated 
219 potentially relevant articles identified for further review 
26 articles identified in  
     reference lists or by  
     colleagues 
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arship Scheme (FOMSS) in South Africa.2 Additional file
2 describes the study outcomes, study designs, sample cri-
teria, sample sizes, data sources, outcome measures, effect
sizes, conclusions, and methodological limitations of all
studies included in the review. Sample sizes across the
thirty-seven studies in which individuals were the unit of
observation ranged from 24 to 493,142. Eighteen studies
had sample sizes greater than 1,000, and four had sample
sizes greater than 50,000.
Types of financial-incentive programs for return of service
In our review, we identified five different types of finan-
cial-incentive programs for return of service, viz.: service-
requiring scholarships (or "conditional scholarships")
(e.g., [57,66]), educational loans with service require-
ments (e.g., [67]), service-option educational loans (e.g.,
[68]), loan repayment programs (e.g., [48]), and direct
financial incentives (e.g., [69]) (Additional file 1). These
program types differ according to the following criteria:
time of commitment and time of money receipt, spending
restrictions, and type of commitment. First, in the case of
service-requiring scholarships, educational loans with
service requirements, and service-option loans, students
commit to participation in a program before or early in
the course of their health care education and receive
money during the education. In the case of loan repay-
ment programs and direct financial incentives, health
workers commit to participation after completion of their
health care education. Direct financial incentives are com-
monly paid at the beginning of service in an underserved
area while loan repayments are commonly made after
each period of service in an underserved area (e.g., every
three or six months). Second, while direct financial incen-
tives can be used for any purpose, the money from any of
the other four programs must be spent on health care edu-
cation either during the education (in the case of service-
requiring scholarships, educational loans with service
requirements, and service-option educational loans) or
after the education to repay educational debt (in the case
of loan repayment programs). Finally, people who partic-
ipate in service-requiring scholarships, loan repayment, or
direct financial-incentive programs commit to work in an
underserved area, while those receiving educational loans
with service requirements commit to service and financial
repayment. Individuals who receive service-option educa-
tional loans commit to either service or financial repay-
ment. While all service option educational loans offer a
choice between service and repayment of the financial
incentive, some of the programs belonging to the other
four types offer a buy-out option. The difference between
service-option loans and service-requiring scholarships
with a buy-out option is that the managers of the former
will normally consider repayment and service equally
desirable outcomes, whereas the managers of the latter
will prefer service over buy-out. Given equal financial
incentives a buy-out is thus commonly more expensive
than the financial repayment of a service-option educa-
tional loan [70]. Note that many loan repayment pro-
grams do not require a buy-out option because the
programs pay participants after each period they have
served in an underserved area.
Program result: recruitment
The recruitment proportion varied between 33% and
100% across programs (see Additional file 2). Fourteen
studies reported for 25 different financial-incentive pro-
grams both the recruitment proportion and the total
number of participants who had ever been eligible to
serve their obligation (or values from which these two var-
iables could be calculated) [45,56-58,66,68,71-73].3 The
random-effects pooled recruitment proportion across
these 25 programs was 71% (95% CI 60–80%, heteroge-
neity p < 0.001).
Program participants who were available for practice, but
did not fulfill their commitment to work in an unders-
erved area, either defaulted on their obligation or bought
out of it. Of the 25 programs included in the meta-analy-
sis, only four did not offer a buy-out option
[57,66,67,72]. Some programs allowed participants to
repay half [74] or all [71,75] of the principal without
interest in lieu of service repayment. Other programs set
the buy-out price at the principal plus interest (the "pre-
vailing rate of interest", or a fixed rate of interest varying
between 2% and 10% [68]), while yet other programs
charged a buyout price of the principal plus a penalty
("principal plus penalty up to 100%", or "triple the loan
amount plus interest" [56]). The random-effects pooled
recruitment proportion across those programs that did
not offer a buy-out option (84%, 95% CI 73–92%, heter-
ogeneity p < 0.001) was not significantly different (overall
test of heterogeneity between subgroups, p = 0.652) from
the pooled recruitment proportion across those programs
that did allow buy-out (67%, 95% CI 55–79%, heteroge-
neity p < 0.001).
Program result: retention
The proportion of program participants who remained in
underserved areas after completing their obligation
ranged from 12% to 90% across the eighteen articles that
reported retention results [41,42,45,56,57,61-
63,67,68,71,74-80]. The reported proportions, however,
could not be meaningfully compared to each other,
because the definition of retention, the length of time dur-
ing which participants were enrolled in a study (enrol-
ment period), and the length of time between the end of
the enrolment period and the time when retention results
were observed (lag time) varied widely across studies. The
studies measured retention in any underserved area in a
country [45,57,61,63,75,77-80], in any underserved areaBMC Health Services Research 2009, 9:86 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/9/86
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in a specific state [68,74], in any area in a specific state
[45,56,61,62], in the underserved area of original pro-
gram placement [41,42,56,67,71,77,78], or in a particular
practice entered during a specific period of time [76].
Three articles reported the retention intentions of program
participants who were fulfilling their obligations at the
time rather than actual retention [41,42,79]. All of the
other 15 articles described outcomes of retrospective
cohort studies. One of the fifteen studies did not report an
enrolment period or lag time [68]. Enrolment periods in
the remaining 14 studies were four [76,77], five [71], nine
[78], ten [57], fifteen [75], eighteen [63,80], nineteen
[67], twenty [62], twenty-three [74], twenty-four [45],
twenty-five [56], and twenty-six [61] years. There was no
lag between enrolment and observation in five studies
[45,56,67,71,74]; lag times in the other studies were 1
[58,63,76,80], 6 [57], 8 [78], 11 [77], and 29 [75] years;
two studies assessed retention results after three different
lag times (3, 7 and 9 years [61] and 9, 13, and 15 years
[62]).
Program effects: provision of care and retention
In all 17 studies of program effects, program participation
was defined as having received a financial incentive and
serving or having served the obligation; i.e., people who
received a financial incentive but could not be recruited to
serve in an underserved area were excluded from the
cohorts of program participants. Figure 2 shows four cate-
gories of effect studies by outcome and sample. Three cat-
egories of studies investigated retention (in the same area,
in the same underserved area, or in any underserved area),
and one category investigated provision of care in any
underserved area. Three studies report two different pro-
gram effect outcomes [53,81,82].
Studies of program effect on retention and provision of care Figure 2
Studies of program effect on retention and provision of care.
    Outcome: retention or provision of care in 
  
Same area  Any underserved area 
S
a
m
p
l
e
 
All physicians  Retention in the same area: 
Holmes 2004 [53] 
Pathman et al. 2004 [48] 
Provision of care in any underserved 
area: 
Brooks et al. 2003 [11] 
Holmes 2004 [53] 
Inoue et al. 2007 [59] 
Matsumoto et al. 2008 [60] 
Pathman et al. 2000 [85] 
Probst et al. 2003 [52] 
Rabinowitz et. al. 2000 [84] 
Rabinowitz et al. 2001 [88] 
Rittenhouse et al. 2008 [65] 
Xu et al. 1997 [86] 
Xu et al. 1997 [87] 
Physicians who 
initially worked in 
an underserved 
Retention in the same underserved 
area: 
Jackson et al. 2003 [58] 
Pathman et al. 1992 [81] 
Pathman et al. 1994 [12] 
Pathman et al. 1994 [82] 
Singer et al. 1998 [83] 
Retention in any underserved area: 
Pathman et al. 1992 [81] 
Pathman et al. 1994 [12] 
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Five of the seven studies that compared retention in the
same  (underserved) area between program participants
and non-participants found that participants were signifi-
cantly less likely to remain in the area [12,48,53,81,82],
while one study did not report a significance level but
found a substantially higher retention in non-NHSC phy-
sicians than in NHSC physicians [83], and another study
did not find a significant difference in retention between
the two groups [58]. In contrast, 11 of the 13 studies that
compared differences between participants and non-par-
ticipants in provision of care or retention in any unders-
erved area found that participants were more likely to
(continue to) practice in such an area
[11,52,53,59,60,65,84-88]. These differences were shown
to be statistically significant in nine of the eleven studies
[11,52,53,65,84-88]. Two studies did not provide the
results of significance tests [59,60]. Two of the thirteen
studies reported the converse finding: program partici-
pants were significantly less likely than non-participants
to remain in any underserved area [81,82].
The studies of program effects reported hazard ratios
[48,81], odds ratios [12,52,65,84,87,88], relative risks (or
two proportions) [11,58-60,82,83,85], or beta-coeffi-
cients [53,86] as measures comparing retention or care
provision among program participants and non-partici-
pants. Except for the two studies that reported hazard
ratios, which took into account the duration of retention
of each individual in the sample [48,81], and one study
that used the proportion of underserved patients as its
dependent variable [86], these studies used a binary con-
cept of retention or care provision measured at different
time intervals after an initial observation (at least 1 year
[58], 1–28 years [65], 3 years and 1 month and 5 years
and 1 month [12], or 5 years [83]) or after graduation
from medical school (0–16 [59], 0–26 [60], 6–21 [88], 7–
9 [53], 7 and 11 [85], 9–10 [84,87], 10–11 [86], 10–20
[82] or up to 29 [52] years, or an unknown time interval
[11]).
Program results and effects: participant satisfaction and 
family satisfaction
Seven studies investigated the satisfaction of participants
with aspects of their enrolment in financial-incentive pro-
grams [12,41,48,58,67,76,77], viz. satisfaction with the
overall experience in the program [48,58,67,77], satisfac-
tion with work [12,41,48,58,76] or personal life
[12,41,76] in the underserved areas, or satisfaction with
aspects of program administration [58,67]. Three studies
examined the satisfaction of members of participants'
families with their lives in the undeserved area [41,48,76].
Four of the seven studies investigated satisfaction out-
comes in the NHSC [12,41,76,77]; the three other studies
examined satisfaction outcomes in US state programs
[48,58,67].
While the studies on participant and family satisfaction
were too few to draw any strong generalized inferences, a
contrast emerged between the NHSC and the US state pro-
grams. Three studies measured overall satisfaction with
financial-incentive programs in US states by asking partic-
ipants whether they would enroll again in the same pro-
gram [48,58,67]. They found a high counterfactual
willingness to enroll again: 71% of interviewed partici-
pants in the North Carolina Rural Loan Program
answered "yes" to the re-enrolment question [67]; 73% of
interviewed participants in four programs in West Virginia
answered either "definitely yes" or "probably yes" to the
re-enrolment question [58]; and 90% of interviewed par-
ticipants in US state programs indicated that they would
"definitely" or "likely" enroll again [48]. In contrast, a
study analyzing 183 unstructured written accounts of time
in the NHSC found that only 20% of participants rated
their experience as "positive", while 80% rated it either
"negative", "mixed or ambivalent", or "neutral" [77].
A similar difference emerged in the comparison of NHSC
and US state-based programs across specific aspects of
participants' work and personal-life satisfaction (Addi-
tional file 2) For instance, in a study of state-based pro-
grams, Pathman and colleagues found that more than
80% of program participants were "satisfied with prac-
tice", more than 90% found their "work rewarding", and
more than 70% felt "a sense of belonging to the commu-
nity," while a comparison group of non-obligated physi-
cians scored significantly lower on all three dimensions of
satisfaction [12]. In contrast, in a study of the NHSC,
Pathman and colleagues found that participants rated
their satisfaction level between "dissatisfied" and "neu-
tral" for 7 of 15 "work issues" and "personal-life" issues
and participants' satisfaction level exceeded "satisfied" for
only one issue (" [c]aring for needy patients"). A control
group of non-participants reported significantly higher
satisfaction than the participants for 9 of 15 issues (for
which a comparison was made) and significantly lower
for only one issue [48].
Program impacts: health system and health
Six articles examined whether financial-incentive pro-
grams have led to changes in the number or density (i.e.,
number per population) of certain types of health workers
[55,64,69,71,74,89]. One of the six studies described the
medical student density in Arizona over time and con-
cluded that a scholarship aiming to increase student den-
sity was not effective [74]. Two studies compared changes
over time – in physician numbers (from 1966 to 1972
[71]) and in physician densities (from 1956 to 1986 [69])
– in northern Ontario to changes in the same measures in
Ontario as a whole. The first study concluded that an
observed increase in the absolute number of physicians in
northern Ontario was likely caused by the programBMC Health Services Research 2009, 9:86 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/9/86
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(because the speed of increase rose substantially after
introduction of the program in northern Ontario, while
there was no change in the speed of increase in Ontario
overall) [71]. The second study concluded that an increase
in physician density in northern Ontario was not due to
the program but due to the overall increase of physicians
in the province (because a measure of inequality between
physician density in northern Ontario and Ontario as a
whole did not improve) [69]. It is possible that an initial
effect of the program in the first three years after its intro-
duction (from 1969 to 1972) – as reported in the first
study [71] – ceased to exist in the longer run (until 1986)
– as reported in the second study [69]. A fourth study used
data from the American Medical Association Masterfile to
model the practice location choices of US physicians in
sequential multinomial logit regression. The parameter
estimates of NHSC participation from the regression
equation were then used to predict the supply of physi-
cians in underserved areas, assuming the NHSC had not
existed. Through comparison of this counterfactual to the
status quo, the study concluded that elimination of the
NHSC would lead to a 10–11% decrease in the supply of
physicians in underserved areas [64].
Two further studies of health system impacts of financial-
incentive programs used communities as units of observa-
tion. One of the studies investigated whether underserved
areas that succeeded in attracting obligated physicians
were different from communities that failed to do so. It
found that communities that were economically worse-
off and had worse population health were less likely to
receive an obligated physician than underserved commu-
nities that were economically better-off and had better
population health [89]. The second study investigated
whether the presence of an obligated physician in a com-
munity changed the supply of non-obligated physicians
in that community and found that, when controlling for a
range of demographic, economic, and health systems fac-
tors, communities staffed by NHSC clinicians experienced
a larger increase in non-NHSC primary care physicians per
population than communities without NHSC clinicians
[55]. Only one study analyzed the effect of a financial-
incentive program on a health outcome [54]. The study
compared age-adjusted all-cause mortality rates in two
periods, 15 years apart, in underserved communities with
different levels of staffing by obligated physicians. It
found no clear relationship between the level of staffing
and mortality.
Causal inferences
Causal inferences from studies reporting program results
are necessarily weak, because these studies merely
describe outcomes in individuals enrolled in financial-
incentive programs and do not allow any comparison to
individuals who did not receive financial incentives.
While analyses of program effects are based on compari-
sons of cohorts of program participants and non-partici-
pants, causal inferences from comparisons of outcomes in
different cohorts can be invalid, if there are no controls for
differences between participants and non-participants.
Of the 17 studies of program effects, 11 controlled for
additional variables in the comparison of retention and
provision of care between people who did and did not
participate in a financial-incentive program
[12,48,52,53,65,81,84-88]. Eight of these studies control-
led for sex of the health worker [48,52,53,65,84,86-88],
five controlled for ethnicity [52,53,84,86,87], four for
medical specialty [12,48,52,81], three for age [48,53,87],
three for growing up in an underserved area [84,86,87],
two for "strong interest" prior to medical school to prac-
tice as a doctor in an underserved area [84,87], two for
childhood family income [84,87], two for characteristics
of the underserved area where the health worker practices
[12,52], one for marital status [48], one for the type of
medical school a participant had attended (private vs.
public, receiving vs. not receiving Title VII-funding [65]4),
one for debt, experience in an underserved area during
medical school, and experience in an underserved area
during residency [87], one for "importance of small com-
munity living" [81], one for commitment to long-term
practice in underserved areas before starting work in such
an area [12], and one for expected peak income, fresh-
man-year plans for family practice, rural preceptorship,
participation in PSAP, and location of family practice
clerkship [88]. Another study did not describe the partic-
ular control variables used, but reported that its effect
measures remained significant "while controlling for
selected characteristics of physicians" [85].
While a number of studies controlled for differences in
observed characteristics between participants and non-
participants, only one study of program effects attempted
to control for unobserved heterogeneity in program par-
ticipation. The study used a bivariate probit selection
model to control for the potential bias due to selective
participation [53]. In order to identify the program effect,
the study used four medical school characteristics, viz. the
"historical proportion of graduates specializing in pri-
mary care", the "quality of the school", a "tuition index",
and a "public school indicator", assuming that these vari-
ables affected selection into financial-incentive programs
but did not affect provision of care or retention in under-
served areas other than through their effect on program
participation. One study of program impact (by the same
author) used the same medical school characteristics as
identifying variables in a joint model of program partici-
pation and practice location decisions [64].BMC Health Services Research 2009, 9:86 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/9/86
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Four of the six other studies of program impacts observed
changes over time in the availability of a financial-incen-
tive program and an outcome (number or density of
health workers [69,71,74] or mortality [69]), but did not
control for changes over time of any other variable. Thus,
in these studies it could not be ruled out that an observed
relationship (or the apparent lack of a relationship)
between program participation and outcome was due to a
confounding variable. In addition, three of the six studies
[69,71,89] may have suffered from ecological bias [90]
because they observed variables at a level of aggregation
that was higher than the level at which inferences were
made. For instance, Anderson and Rosenberg (1990) [69]
observed changes in physicians density in counties in order
to evaluate the impact of the Ontario Underserviced Area
Program in attracting physicians to underserved communi-
ties  within those counties. Thus, the observed average
change in physician density in any a county could have
been caused by an infinite number of combinations of
effect sizes in the different underserviced and sufficiently
serviced communities in the county.
Discussion
Of the 43 studies included in the review, 34 evaluated
financial-incentive programs located in the US. The
remainder examined programs in other developed coun-
tries (Japan, Canada, New Zealand), with but one excep-
tion that described a program in South Africa. The US
financial-incentive programs have placed substantial
numbers of health workers in underserved areas. For
instance, between 1972 and 2009, the NHSC – the largest
financial-incentive program in the US – placed approxi-
mately 30,000 primary care clinicians in underserved
areas [46]. At the same time, the US programs have met
only a small proportion of national unmet health care
need. In 2008, 4,600 clinicians were serving in the NHSC,
but according to NHSC estimates 27,000 additional pri-
mary care professionals were required to provide care to
the 50 million people who still lacked access to primary
health care in the United States [91].
While most of the evaluated programs were located in the
US, the US market for health care education is unusual in
comparison to many other countries in that students pay
high tuition for their education. Countries where students
of health care do not usually incur large debt, such as
many Western European countries, may not be as success-
ful as the US in recruiting students and health profession-
als into programs that provide scholarships or repayment
of educational loans in return for service in underserved
areas. In many developing countries, by contrast, educa-
tion for a health profession can be quite costly because of
tuition and school fees as well as costs of housing and liv-
ing. Some of the experiences from the US may thus be
more applicable to health care education markets in
developing countries than to other developed countries.
On the other hand, (future) health workers in the US have
many options for funding their education, while funding
opportunities for education may be few in some develop-
ing countries. Thus, the generalizability of US findings to
other countries where students have substantial financing
need for health care education may be limited because the
selection into financial-incentive programs for unders-
erved service may depend on the availability of funding
alternatives. Numerous other differences, such as in the
capacity to enforce and monitor obligated service (com-
pare [92]), may limit the generalizability of the studies
included in this review to other settings. One study from
South Africa suggests that scholarship programs for health
care education can be a successful instrument to recruit
health workers for practice in rural Africa [66]. Future
studies should evaluate outcomes of financial-incentive
programs from other developing countries where such
programs have been offered in the past or are currently
offered, such as Swaziland [93], Ghana [94], and Mexico
[95].
Notwithstanding the above caveats about generalizability,
it is useful to summarize some of the key findings from
our review. First, most of the financial-incentive programs
experienced substantial losses to recruitment before the
start of the service obligation. Across the 25 programs
included in the meta-analysis in our review, on average
about 3 in 10 participants did not fulfill their commit-
ment to work in an underserved area. However, there was
wide variation in loss to recruitment. As reported previ-
ously by Pathman and colleagues [48] and Jackson and
colleagues [58], state programs in the US that committed
students to service (service-requiring scholarships and
educational loans with service requirements) had signifi-
cantly lower recruitment proportions than state programs
that committed health workers after their training (direct
financial incentives and loan repayment programs). This
finding is not surprising, because preferences change over
time. For instance, students who found careers in primary
care appealing at entry into medical school may develop a
strong interest in highly specialized health care during
their training, which depends on technology that is usu-
ally not available in underserved areas.
Furthermore, we find that the recruitment proportion did
not differ significantly between programs that offered a
buy-out option and those that did not. While this result
suggests that participants who have decided not to serve
their obligation will do so independent of the conditions
of the program they are enrolled in, it is important to note
that the proportion of participants who would have taken
up work in underserved areas had they not enrolled in a
specific financial-incentive program is unknown. Thus, itBMC Health Services Research 2009, 9:86 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/9/86
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is impossible to infer from such comparison the relative
recruitment effectiveness of different types of programs.
Second, participants in financial-incentive programs were
significantly more likely to leave their sites of first practice
after completion of their obligation than non-obligated
health workers in comparable sites of first practice after
service of similar length of time. There may be several rea-
sons for this finding. For one, some of those health work-
ers who – without financial incentive – find practice in
any underserved area less attractive than practice in sites
that are not underserved decide to enroll in financial-
incentive programs and to complete their obligations.
These health workers are likely to leave the underserved
area after having served the obligated term. On the other
hand, even those obligated health workers who find prac-
tice in underserved areas to be the most attractive career
path in general may be more likely to leave their sites of
initial practice than their non-obligated colleagues in the
same underserved areas. Obligated health workers have
less choice over the particular underserved area in which
they first practice than their non-obligated peers and are
thus less likely to be satisfied with their work and personal
life in the underserved area. For instance, one study of the
NHSC concludes that NHSC enrollees "placed in rural
sites in the late 1980s experienced a site-matching process
that they felt offered few acceptable sites" and "offered lit-
tle opportunity to locate the bestsuited site among those
offered" [12]. Financial-incentive programs aiming to
achieve high retention of health workers in the sites where
they fulfill their obligated service should attempt to
accommodate health workers' wishes to practice in a par-
ticular underserved area to the greatest extent possible.
Third, while participants in financial-incentive programs
were less likely than non-participants to remain in the par-
ticular underserved area of first practice, the reviewed
studies suggest that participants were more likely to prac-
tice in some underserved area or to work with an unders-
erved population than their peers who did not participate
in a financial-incentive program. This summary finding
from our systematic review is in contrast to the conclusion
of the one previous review of financial incentives for
return of service, which concluded that incentive pro-
grams "have achieved their primary goal of short-term
recruitment but have had less success with long-term
retention" [18].
Many of the analyses of retention in studies in this review
compared the behavior of participants in financial-incen-
tive programs to that of non-participants, controlling for
a few observed health worker characteristics, such as sex,
age, ethnicity, or marital status. However, since partici-
pants self-selected into programs, it is difficult to identify
whether any difference in behavior between participants
and non-participants was due to unobserved characteris-
tics distinguishing participants from non-participants or
due to program effects. It is possible that those health
workers with the strongest preferences to serve unders-
erved populations chose to participate in financial-incen-
tive programs and that these unobserved preferences fully
explain the different work and retention patterns in partic-
ipants and non-participants, i.e., participants would have
worked for exactly the same lengths of time in unders-
erved areas without the incentives they received.
An ideal strategy to identify causal effects of financial-
incentive programs is randomized controlled trials. How-
ever, since program participation is an individual choice,
it will be impossible to randomize individuals into pro-
gram participation and control arms. While it would the-
oretically be possible to randomize cohorts of medical
students (e.g., by year of graduation or by medical school)
to financial-incentive offers of different sizes, such a rand-
omization strategy may not be politically or administra-
tively feasible. An alternative strategy to identify causal
effects involves the use of statistical models that control
for selection into financial-incentive programs on unob-
served individual characteristics. Two studies in this
review (one of program effect [53] and one of program
impact [64]) implemented selection models of program
participation. The two studies used medical school char-
acteristics (e.g., the "historical proportion" of graduates
pursuing careers in primary care) to identify program
effect. However, the type of medical school that students
choose is likely to be related not only to the decision to
enroll in financial-incentive programs, but also – inde-
pendent of program participation – to the decision to
work in underserved areas. For instance, students with
strong preferences to work in underserved areas may be
more likely than their peers with weaker preferences for
such care to select medical schools with a high "historical
proportion" of graduates pursuing careers in primary care,
because such schools are likely to focus on medical educa-
tion relevant for underserved practice. This selection may
determine work location decisions, independent of any
effect the medical school characteristic may have on par-
ticipation in financial-incentive programs. Thus the char-
acteristic may not be a valid variable to identify program
effects. Despite the difficulty in finding variables to iden-
tify program effects in selection models, future studies
using already-existing data should emphasize control of
biases due to selection effects. In the absence of a valid
method to control for selection into program participa-
tion on unobserved variables, studies of retention and
provision of care should attempt to control for variables
capturing health workers' preferences to work in unders-
erved areas before financial-incentive programs could
have influenced those preferences. Studies in this review
controlled for intention to work in an underserved areaBMC Health Services Research 2009, 9:86 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/9/86
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prior to the decision to enroll in a financial-incentive pro-
gram [84,87], for the intention to practice in an unders-
erved area for a time period that is longer than the service
obligation in a financial-incentive program prior to such
practice [12], or for variables that are likely to be closely
related to the preference to work in an underserved area in
the absence of financial incentives, such as having grown
up in an underserved area [84,87] or a predilection for liv-
ing in small communities [81]. Two of these four studies
found that physicians participating in the NHSC were sig-
nificantly less likely than non-NHSC physicians to remain
in the same underserved area where they initially took up
work [12,81], while the other two found that NHSC par-
ticipants are significantly more likely to provide care in an
underserved area than non-NHSC physicians [84,87].
These four studies suggest more strongly than the other
studies in this review that the finding that program partic-
ipants are more likely than non-participants to work in
underserved areas in the long run (even though they are
less likely to remain at their site of original placement) is
indeed causal. Nonetheless, they cannot rule out that the
observed effects are due to selection on unobserved varia-
bles.
Fourth, financial-incentive programs varied substantially
in the level of participant satisfaction. Participants in
some programs were more satisfied than non-participants
with their work and personal life in underserved areas,
while the converse was true for participants in other pro-
grams. Health workers' satisfaction with work and per-
sonal life in underserved areas is important for several
reasons. For one, health worker satisfaction influences
retention, as has been shown in several studies [96-98],
including in studies of financial-incentive programs for
return of service [12,41,63]. Moreover, health worker sat-
isfaction is associated with patient satisfaction [99] and
quality of care [100,101]. Health workers are also likely to
share their experiences with colleagues and may thus
influence the supply of health workers to underserved
areas as well as participation in financial-incentive pro-
grams. The reviewed studies offer some insight into the
mechanism through which individual programs affect
participant satisfaction. This evidence, based on case
reports and participants' accounts, suggests that programs
that achieved high participant satisfaction successfully
interacted with participants during different stages of pro-
gram enrolment, viz. participant selection, the matching
of underserved areas to the preferences of individual par-
ticipants, preparation of the participants and their fami-
lies before the start of the obligated service, as well as
career guidance, mentoring, monitoring of problems, and
ongoing support during the service [12,48,58,66,70,77].
Detailed case studies of relatively successful and unsuc-
cessful programs could further improve our understand-
ing of management skills, organizational processes, and
program features that increase participant satisfaction and
retention in underserved areas.
Fifth, there is no clear evidence that financial-incentive
programs had any significant impact on the supply of
health workers to underserved areas. The results of three
studies suggest that certain programs led to an increase in
health worker numbers or densities, while two other stud-
ies did not find such program impacts. This discrepancy
could be due to actual differences in impact between pro-
grams or over time; or they could be caused by methodo-
logical limitations of the studies. The impact of financial-
incentive programs on health worker numbers and densi-
ties is not only a function of program scale and program
effect on participating individuals, but depends also on
the effect of the programs on non-participating health
workers. It is plausible that participating health workers
will deter non-participants from practice in underserved
communities because the former will compete with the
latter for patients and practice personnel. Conversely, it
also seems plausible that the inflow of program partici-
pants into underserved communities attracts non-partici-
pating health workers to the same communities because
the former decrease the overall work load per health
worker (which may be perceived as too high) and increase
opportunities for referral and exchange among colleagues.
A study by Pathman and colleagues is significant insofar
as it suggests "that the NHSC contributed positively to the
non-NHSC primary care physician workforce in the rural
underserved counties where its clinicians worked during
the 1980s and 1990s" [55]. In the above discussion of
summary findings from our review, we caution that the
existing evidence regarding program results, effects, and
impacts does not allow (strong) causal inferences. It is fur-
ther important to keep in mind that the summaries are
across five countries, five types of programs, programs of
different geographic reach ranging from community to
country, seven types of health workers, and study publica-
tion dates ranging from 1963 to 2008. Program recruit-
ment, retention, and satisfaction outcomes differed
widely, even within some of the strata defined by program
location, type, geographical reach, health worker type,
and time period. Health planners can use our review to
gain an overview of the existing evidence. In designing
future programs, however, they need to carefully consider
the applicability of findings from the studies in the review
to the market for health care education in their country,
the specific health worker group they intend to target with
a program, and the type of underserved areas they aim to
supply with program participants.
Conclusion
Financial-incentive programs for return of service are one
of the few health policy interventions to improve the dis-
tribution of human resources for health on which sub-BMC Health Services Research 2009, 9:86 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/9/86
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stantial evidence exists. However, the majority of studies
to date are from the US and only one study reports find-
ings from a developing country. The existing studies show
that financial-incentive programs placed substantial num-
bers of health workers in underserved areas and that pro-
gram participants were more likely than non-participants
to work in underserved areas in the long run, even though
they were less likely to remain at their site of original
placement. As none of the existing studies can fully rule
out that the observed differences between participants
and non-participants are due to selection effects, the evi-
dence to date does not allow the inference that the pro-
grams have caused increases in the supply of health
workers to underserved areas. In order to improve the
scope of evidence on financial-incentive programs for
return of service in underserved areas, future studies
should evaluate programs from a more diverse set of
countries, in particular in the developing world. In these
studies, researchers should attempt to control selection
biases as rigorously as possible, using selection models in
observational studies and randomized controlled trials
where funders and policy makers are willing to support
such experiments.
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Appendix
Endnotes
1In this article, unless otherwise specified, we use the term
underserved area for underserved communities, regions,
or populations within countries, as well as for countries
where by some standards even the best-served geographic
regions are underserved. The precise definition of unders-
erved area differs across the financial-incentive programs
evaluated in the studies reviewed in this article. The differ-
ent definitions are reported in Additional file 1.
2One study evaluated jointly the NHSC and US state pro-
grams (Additional file 1). It is included in the count of
both studies evaluating the NHSC and studies evaluating
US state programs.
3Three studies reported recruitment proportions in the
same program using highly overlapping samples of partic-
ipants [45,59,62]. Of the three studies, we only included
the one with the largest sample size in the meta-analysis
[45].
4In the US, "Title VII grants are intended to strengthen the
primary care educational infrastructure at medical schools
and residency programs and to encourage physiciansin-
training to pursue careers working with underserved pop-
ulations" [65].
Search algorithms
PubMed search
("Health Manpower" [MeSH Term] OR "Health Person-
nel" [MeSH Term] OR "Students" [MeSH Term] OR
"Internship and Residency" [MeSH Term] OR "Education,
Medical" [MeSH Term])
AND
("Medically Underserved Area" [MeSH Term] OR "Profes-
sional Practice Location" [MeSH Term] OR "Rural Health"
[MeSH Term] OR "Rural Health Services" [MeSH Term]
OR "Primary Health Care" [MeSH Term] OR "Family
Practice" [MeSH Term] OR "Career Choice" [MeSH
Term])
AND
("Financial Support" [MeSH Term] OR "Training Sup-
port" [MeSH Term] OR "Physician Incentive Plans"
[MeSH Term] OR "Health Planning" [MeSH Term])
EMBASE search
('health care manpower'/exp OR 'health care personnel'/
exp OR 'student'/exp OR 'medical education'/exp)
AND
('rural health care'/exp OR 'professional practice'/exp OR
'primary health care'/exp OR 'general practice'/exp)
AND
('student assistance program'/exp OR 'finance'/exp OR
'health care personnel management'/exp OR 'health care
planning'/exp)
AND
[embase]/lim NOT [31-01-2009]/sd AND [<1950-2009]/
py
CINAHL search
((MH "Health Manpower+") or (MH "Nursing Man-
power+") or (MH "Health Personnel+") or (MH "Stu-
dents+") or (MH "Internship and Residency") or (MH
"Education+"))
andBMC Health Services Research 2009, 9:86 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/9/86
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((MH "Medically Underserved Area") or (MH "Rural
Health") or (MH "Rural Health Services") or (MH "Pri-
mary Health Care") or (MH "Family Practice") or (MH
"Career Planning and Development"))
and
((MH "Financial Support+") or (MH "Employee Incentive
Programs") or (MH "Health and Welfare Planning+"))
NHS EED search
((Health Manpower) OR (Health Personnel) OR (Stu-
dents) OR (Internship and Residency) OR (Medical Edu-
cation))
AND
((Medically Underserved Area) OR (Professional Practice
Location) OR (Rural Health) OR (Rural Health Services)
OR (Primary Health Care) OR (Family Practice))
AND
((Career Choice) OR (Financial Support) OR (Training
Support) OR (Physician Incentive Plans) OR (Health
Planning)) in NHS Economic Evaluation Database
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